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Chapter Ten
Towards a ‘Cyber Maastricht’: Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back
Agnes Kasper & Vlad Alex Vernygora
Abstract
This chapter evaluates the EU’s cybersecurity policy from four perspectives – 
neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, post-functionalism, and the 
imperial paradigm. A search for a theory-based framework is performed to ensure 
that the analysis in this chapter is completed within a set of boundaries, and does 
not stray into speculation about the EU’s prospective strategic steps. Using this 
contribution’s findings and elaborations, a proposal on the policy-associated model is 
made. Having observed the empirical data, while analytically reflecting on actuality, 
it can be argued that a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ is long overdue.
Introduction
Cybersecurity is an invisible, collective and ubiquitous challenge in our modern life, 
as we have computerised most of the main human functions suited to contemporary 
lifestyles. Computers are used to distribute natural resources, feelings, and state 
functions, and, within our communities, we have begun to set some rules for these 
processes. The current EU cybersecurity policy is a result of several developments, and 
considering this chapter’s title, there is a certain degree of positivity associated with 
this process. However, it is still unclear how this development is being strategised and 
where it might lead the EU to. Regardless of any ideological or historical connotations, 
one can assess the step-by-step developments when the process takes place within 
a framework. In the context of cybersecurity, it appears that different forces are 
pulling and pushing the actual development and the complexity of the domain can 
lead us to contradictory logics, while we are searching for explanations. Arguably, a 
framework can be ‘crafted’ for the EU by political science, and this contribution will 
be relying on several multi-disciplinary approaches to clarify the issues.
Retrospectively, if we focus too much on the revolutionary prediction that 
“Cyberwar is coming!” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993) and the no less revolutionary 
“Cyber war will not take place” (Rid, 2012), it is likely that a number of important 
events, which occurred between these Cassandrical statements, will ensure that 
those statements will not be forgotten. For example, in 2007, the Republic of Estonia 
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became a “subject of a new form of ‘cyber violence’”, when it experienced a large-
scale denial of service (Haataja, 2017, p. 160). Those cyber events were a side-story for 
many, who found themselves living through an unexpected ‘explosion’ of political 
tensions, which demonstrated how an entire country can easily be brought to the 
brink of collapse if it is dependent on information and communication technologies 
for its vital functions.
In 2010, a cyber ‘worm’ called ‘Stuxnet’ affected over 60,000 computers in several 
countries (from Iran to the United States, from Germany to Australia), interlinking a 
simple USB stick with centrifuges containing uranium-235 (Farwell and Rohozinski, 
2011, pp. 23–24). Indeed, theoretically, in order to make a destructive difference, no 
tanks and artillery are needed. Although this scenario remains popular for science 
fiction movies, rather than the history books – right now technological developments 
may have brought us close to these scenarios and for a geo-strategically ‘herbivorous’ 
entity as the EU, such a situation should be of special concern. In scholarly terms, it 
has arguably become one of the main catalysts for the grand-debate on what the EU 
is and in what framework the EU acts.
The roots of the EU lie in the historic rivalry between France and Germany, and the 
recognition that peace can be maintained through intense collaboration in the field 
of political economy. In the early 1950s, coal and steel were the basis of a country’s 
power, given the industries’ role in war-waging, and hence the 1951 Treaty of Paris 
concentrated on the prevention of future security threats by pooling resources, 
establishing common oversight mechanisms, and a common market for products 
and resources in these areas. The mid-twentieth century economic collaboration was 
seen as a means to prevent war – a paramount security threat. Today, the EU has 
turned into an entity that is unmatched elsewhere in scope and depth of integration, 
and this process took place in the context of lasting peace. This provides a platform 
for theories of positive integration, which acknowledges that security threats led 
to economic interdependencies. However, most of these integration theories seem 
to ignore the changed and modern security interdependencies. As Börzel and 
Risse (2018) argue, economic interdependencies are not always able to explain the 
reasons for (or lack of ) regional integration: in economically interdependent North 
America or Northeast Asia, supranational institutions are scarce, and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is empowered to intervene militarily 
in its member states without their consent, although trade levels between ECOWAS 
members remain low.
Historically, the EU’s legal and policy measures in the field of cybersecurity have 
been motivated by the need to create and complete the European Single Market, whose 
dynamics have been mostly explicable by the spillover effect (Kasper and Antonov, 
2019). The EU’s new Cybersecurity Strategy sets out a plan to improve cyber resilience, 
deterrence and defence, and creates a horizontal policy overlapping and intertwined 
with several other EU policy areas. Such a complex issue as this is naturally ‘plagued’ 
by conflicting interests and controversies; in particular, that the implications go way 
188
beyond economic aspects and the Single Market associated needs. A distinct problem 
has been the difficulty in collecting, sharing, and operationalizing cybersecurity 
information among actors (sometimes, it is referred to as cyber threat intelligence 
or CTI, be it in the private or public sectors). Nothing illustrates this point better 
than the legislative history of the Directive on security of network and information 
systems (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, NIS Directive), where the Commission’s original 
proposal was changed to exclude the public sector, while calls for more actionable 
information sharing with the private sector were ignored at the EU legislative level. 
Cooperation and integration in this field deserve special attention, since at the core of 
resource pooling, oversight and regulation of the market,  we are dealing with data 
and information – which, probably, are also the main resources for waging cyber and 
hybrid wars, because, arguably, they are the twenty-first century equivalent of coal 
and steel.
It is likely that the EU may be losing its way in the process of reflective, unsystematic, 
and inertial application of its very own and predominantly spillover-based integrative 
elements of cooperation and entering into a set of objectively new relationships, 
which necessarily require a different framework, an issue-specific system, a revision 
of all major theories of positive integration, and an explicitly determined range of 
policy clusters to confront it. In other words, cybersecurity is more complex than 
it is currently represented by existing EU processes, and more express links should 
be drawn between the market-oriented, security and defence fields. Cybersecurity, 
whether it is considered as a process or a point of arrival, makes it nonpareil for 
‘shining’ at the EU’s highest echelons of discussion, because “[a] stable system defines 
the behaviour of the collective as a whole” (Lotman, 2013, p. 62).
Hence, an enquiry on a strengthened theoretical framework should be performed, 
investigating the fit between EU cybersecurity policy and integration theories, to 
detect where the borderlines of the relationship should be, so that a proper policy 
framework can be provided within its boundaries. To achieve this end, a proposal 
based on a schematic three pillar-based model is made here. We do not adopt any 
particular theory to explain the EU’s policy on cybersecurity, but we do engage in a 
path-finding mission to find correlations. Indeed, we leave it for future research to 
dwell on the details.
Methodologically, this material extensively employs a pluralistic range of 
classic and cross-boundary qualitative techniques, elicited from discourse analysis, 
process tracing and normative content analysis. As Neumann (2008, p. 62) argues, 
discourse analysis not only “seeks to capture the inevitable cultural changes in 
representations of reality”, but a particular discourse in itself “maintains a degree 
of regularity in social relations […], produc[ing] preconditions for action”. It is not 
worrying that the reason for an action cannot be fully determined by analysing a 
discourse that is corresponding to it – instead, process tracing is required in such 
cases. Characteristically for this classic qualitative tool, it can assist in providing 
a number of theoretical alternatives, because the in-depth checking procedure 
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(on what factor is linked to which) can encourage research to consider different 
theoretical frameworks. Indeed, the further the EU drifts away from the theoretical 
paradigms of the 1950s, the more stagnating its integrative framework is becoming. 
In the highly complicated case of cybersecurity, this contribution suggests that, by 
necessity, EU policy requires a solid theoretical fit (or, at least, the EU is in askance of 
a useful theory) built on a neo-functional, intergovernmental, and post-functional 
analytical instrumentarium, whilst keeping in mind an imperial paradigm as a 
means to explain the EU’s organisational nature more precisely.
Finally, on a further methodological note, the EU has an inbuilt normative 
characteristic. Norms are thus very important in this empirical investigation to 
observe the relevant processes and find interlinkages between them. By determining 
the right set of normative material and contextualising the data, it is possible to 
analytically “account for the nuances and complexities that are part of any political 
phenomenon” (Hermann, 2008, p. 160). For the context and stakeholders’ attitudes, 
we will also refer back to the previous chapter in this book – ‘EU Cybersecurity 
Governance – Stakeholders and Normative Intentions towards Integration’ – which 
outlined the rise and current features, as well as the institutional background of the 
EU’s cybersecurity policy.
Searching for a proper framework
There is nothing extraordinary in searching for a framework, because an academic 
wishes to “place rigid boundaries around the domain of philosophical inquiry” 
(McCormick, 2003, p. 255). Apart from being attributed by positivists to Immanuel 
Kant, it has a longer history and a life within post-positivism. It is advantageous 
to achieve a “greater accuracy of description” (Lotman, 2013, pp. 48–49), and it goes 
well with this contribution since it is aiming at detecting the exclusive range of 
constituent clusters for EU policymaking on cybersecurity.
What is also relevant for the context is that the EU, meticulously treasuring its 
‘theoretical’ organisational background, has consistently been a theory-driven 
entity in its policymaking. Through its existence, the EU has literally encouraged 
international scholarship to analyse its development, and in the process, this ‘created’ 
some of the major integration theories as well. There was a relatively sceptical vision 
of Robert Keohane (1984, p. 49) that “the Europeans” do not have the functional 
capacity to grow into a hegemon “in the foreseeable future”, but this is questioned by 
actuality. A hegemon has different qualities, and the EU’s distinct hegemonic stance 
in international trade is not a matter for serious academic disputes.
Practically and usually, a particular EU policy could receive backing from a single 
theoretical concept (for example, intergovernmentalism for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). However, there are many situations when the EU aims 
at combining a few theories in order to establish a decent framework for a policy 
(e.g. regionalism, neo-regionalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism for the 
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European Neighbourhood Policy/ENP). The level of effectiveness in each case has 
been different: the EU’s ‘exam marks’ in political economy are rather high, but when 
it comes to the entity’s ‘tests’ on geo-strategy, there is still plenty of ‘homework’ that 
needs to be completed by Brussels and, to an extent, Strasbourg. On cybersecurity, as 
it was argued in the introductory notes of this chapter, there is a likelihood that, in 
order to positively benefit from the policy-focused theoretical support, the EU has 
to seek some assistance from among the analytical postulates of the following four 
concepts: neo-functionalism, intergovernmental theory, post-functionalism, and a 
scholarly ‘treatment’ of the EU as a contemporary political empire.
Neo-functionalism: a ‘puzzle’ of transnational interdependence and 
supranational capacity
Within a decade from the start of the European integration process, Ernst Haas 
(1958), reflecting on the project’s development, offered a holistic observational 
concept exemplified by it. His neo-functionalism, was only semantically linked 
to David Mitrany’s seminal contributions (1975), but it helped the EU’s founders in 
interpreting what they were functionally doing to ‘run away’ faster from the past. 
At the end of the day, as the theory was elucidated by its competing ‘cousin’ (post-
functionalism) much later in time, the neo-functional framework postulated “a series 
of mutually reinforcing processes that [would] lead to further integration” (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2019, p. 2). Arguably, the so-called neo-functional spillover became the 
EU’s major, as well as almost unquestionable, methodological tool in a number of 
important framework-building exercises (for example, in the case of working out 
the euro convergence criteria). It is also true that the EU missed few opportunities 
to perform some kind of “distilling” (McGowan, 2007) of neo-functionalism. 
Further down the track, the ‘spillover effect’, as noted, became “almost completely 
detached from its puzzling fathering theory” and, like in the peculiar case of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), was even applied to a geographic area, which 
Brussels could not operationally control (Vernygora et al., 2016, p. 14). Should neo-
functionalism be employed in the context of the EU’s policy on cybersecurity?
The basic underlying rationale for cybersecurity cooperation can be viewed in 
terms of securitised functional logics: the dependence of the EU’s economy and 
citizens’ every-day life on information and communication technologies create 
exposures that endanger the Digital Single Market, European democracies, freedoms 
and values. Bergmann and Niemann (2018) point out that sectors and issues can be 
interdependent to the extent that differentiation may prove extremely difficult. This 
is even truer in the context of cybersecurity, where the underlying technologies 
operate without respect for state borders and are decentralised in nature.
Functional discrepancies and links can certainly be identified in the EU’s 
cybersecurity policy, for instance between the free movement of digital products 
and the need for safe and secure Internet that fosters consumer trust. In this case, 
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criminal law enforcement plays a significant deterrent role against cybercrimes, but 
it compromises consumer trust. In order to investigate offences, law enforcement 
agencies, more often than not, need to collect evidence from information systems 
outside their national borders, and they need it fast, whereas the current mechanisms 
for cross-border cooperation to collect evidence can be burdensome. Hence, the EU 
proposed the E-evidence Regulation that creates the European Preservation and 
Production Orders, mechanisms associated with procedures that are, presumably, 
easier to implement vis-a-vis private sector stakeholders. However, this has also 
opened a window outside the EU, since the largest actors in the EU are U.S.-based 
companies. The USA had also decided to address digital evidence collection, which 
resulted in conflicting legislations with the EU (additionally there are some legal 
issues and conflicts in the GDPR), while the Council of Europe (CoE) is also busy with 
negotiations on an additional protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, addressing 
questions of digital evidence.
On 5 February 2019, the European Commission proposed to start a round of 
international negotiations on cross-border access to electronic evidence, which 
is necessary to track down dangerous criminals and terrorists, and two sets of 
negotiating directives were issued: one for negotiations with the USA, and the other 
for the Second Additional Protocol to the CoE-originated Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime (Joint Statement on the Launch of EU-U.S. Negotiations to Facilitate 
Access to Electronic Evidence, 2019). The logic that a single market issue needs to 
create higher levels of consumer trust for digital products, leads to functional 
pressures in the security and foreign relations domain, in this case the e-evidence 
negotiations with the USA and the CoE, which Bergmann and Niemann (2018) 
described as “external spillover”.
Another functional discrepancy can briefly be indicated between the high-level 
network and information security requirements, as in the NIS Directive (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2016) and the need for standardisation and certification 
schemes. Evaluation of the security levels of networks and information systems, 
as well as digital services and products, to ensure conformity with EU-wide or at 
least harmonised cybersecurity standards, hence the Cybersecurity Act (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2019), confer new competences, tasks and resources on 
the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (which has been 
transformed into the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency).
Functional pressures stemming from the Single Market also seem to appear in 
the field of security and defence, notwithstanding that some scholars deny this 
(Bergmann and Niemann, 2018). On the basis of the 2013 Single Market-focused 
Cybersecurity Strategy, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework was adopted in 
2014 (Council of the EU, 2014) and updated in 2018 (Council of the EU, 2018a). These 
strategies envisage EU and NATO cooperation on cybersecurity and defence. In 2018, 
the EU cyber defence staff also took part in the NATO’s Cyber Coalition exercise, in 
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Estonia (NATO News, 2018).31 Functional pressures, linkages and interdependencies 
may seem to point to the neo-functional theory of integration; however, it is not able 
to account for a significant part of the EU’s cybersecurity policy, since transnational 
actors remain ‘toothless’ when it comes to issues beyond purely private business and 
the Single Market.
The role of supranational institutions enjoys distinct attention of neo-functionalist 
theories of integration. Niemann (2016) explains that supranational institutions foster 
integration processes when they behave as policy entrepreneurs or when leveraging 
their central positions or authority to influence various actors. Hooghe and Marks 
add that this is a continuous process reinforced by learning, changing preferences 
and tactics, until the supranational actors become stronger and more autonomous 
(2019, pp. 2–3). After learning the lessons from international cyber incidents, and 
because of direct attacks, cybersecurity became one of the most salient issues in the 
EU’s agenda (Christou, 2016, p. 1), and the European Commission has played a very 
significant role in promoting integrated policy development in cybersecurity.
However, the cross-jurisdictional nature of problem areas put supranational 
institutions in a position where their impetus for greater cooperation and integration 
encounters significant resistance based on Westphalian principles. One of the most 
intricate issues involves cybersecurity information collection and sharing, which 
cuts across policy levels. During the 2012 stakeholder consultations in preparation of 
the NIS Directive, 87.5% of respondents indicated that public administrations should 
be subject to security requirements. In particular, 93.5% considered that public 
administrations should report security breaches (besides banking and financial 
sector, transport, health, energy and internet services). While this signified a call for 
Member States’ accountability and was backed by the EU institutions such as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, the European Parliament, and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Council of the EU was not ready for a new 
grand design that impinges upon the heart of the Member States’ sovereignty. The 
Economic and Social Committee (2014) had stated that the NIS Directive should 
take the form of a regulation, which would leave little discretion in Member States’ 
hands. The proposal’s provisions would have led to the setting up of a cooperation 
network and secure information-exchange system between the Member States, the 
Commission and ENISA, and provide for coordinated response according to the 
EU’s NIS Cooperation Plan. It would have imposed security requirements of public 
administrations, but these were toned down to the minimum by the Council which 
meant that only some core private actors in cyberspace (essential services operators, 
cloud services, e-marketplaces and search engines) were affected and breach 
notification frameworks were set up. The focus remained one-sided, imposing 
31 See more in NATO (2018) NATO and the European Union work together to tackle 
growing cyber threats. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161570.
htm?selectedLocale=en
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mandatory controls on information flows between the private and public sectors and 
leaving cooperation between Member States at the voluntary level. The Council’s 
formal message was (Council of the EU, 2013):
Many Member states have been in favour of more flexibility, limiting the 
adoption of binding rules at EU level to critical and basic requirements, to 
be supplemented by optional measures. Other delegations on the contrary, 
considered that only legally binding measures could guarantee the network 
security throughout the EU.
Additionally, competences and resources are still lacking at the supranational level, 
since implementation of the cybersecurity policy and operational capacity lies with 
the Member States, as the “Member States remain responsible for national security, 
the scale and cross-border nature of the threat make a powerful case for EU action 
providing incentives and support for Member States to develop and maintain more 
and better national cybersecurity capabilities, while at the same time building EU-
level capacity” (European Commission, 2017).
The EU’s capacities are being strengthened, and the establishment of the EU’s 
Cybersecurity Agency endowed with financial, human and some operational 
resources testifies to this ongoing process, but in politically more sensitive areas 
the competence of supranational institutions is called into question by the Member 
States while they are engaging in a “common reflection process” with DAPIX experts 
[Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX)] on data 
retention (Council of the EU, 2018b). This behavior amounts to ignoring the highest 
courts’ repeated rulings against blanket data retention legislation. This is not to 
say that neo-functionalist ‘episodes’ do not take place in the EU and cyberspace. A 
number of EU institutions have been active and accumulating significant expertise 
in cybersecurity, including the Commission, ENISA, European Defence Agency, etc, 
which on their own or by leveraging functional inefficiencies, budgetary powers or 
institutional gaps, can lead to a strengthening of their role, which could eventually 
lead to deeper integration of the EU (Kasper and Mölder, 2019, forthcoming).
With reference to the explanation by Hooghe and Marks (2019, p. 3) of the neo-
functionalist views that “integration is the outcome of cooperation and competition 
among societal actors”, one can find little evidence to support a claim that stakeholders 
other than the Member States steer the deepening European integration in the 
cybersecurity domain. Since 2016, the EU has positioned itself on a trajectory towards 
strategic autonomy, including that in cyberspace. The 2017-revised EU cybersecurity 
strategy, and, in particular, the 2018 update of the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, 
emphasise the growing linkages between cybersecurity and cyber defence, yet the 
Member States’ hesitation about the EU as a (cyber) security community is still 
manifested in the volunteer nature of information sharing mechanisms (apart from 
the breach notifications obligations imposed on private sector players), signifying 
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their readiness to work to create a ‘cyber steel and coal community’, which is still a 
long way from a ‘Cyber Maastricht’.
(Still) Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Member States, their preferences 
and bargaining power
In a way, Liberal Intergovernmentalism could hardly be outlined using a more 
straightforward route than the one chosen by Andrew Moravcsik. Being presumably 
driven by a justified desire to reshuffle the postulates of intergovernmentalism and 
to see how much out of the Westphalian paradigm would be considered practically 
applicable in the present situation, Moravcsik (1998, p. 4) linked the positive 
effectiveness of European integration with “economic interests, relative power, [and] 
credible commitments” of the Member States as long as they continue to subscribe 
to a liberal outlook. In other words, as Schimmelfennig (2015, p. 178) extensively 
explained much later, the process of integration “results from three steps that translate 
the incentives created by international interdependence into collective institutional 
outcomes: the domestic formation of national preferences, intergovernmental 
bargaining to substantive agreements and the creation of institutions to secure these 
agreements”. Another summary of this iconic concept is supplied by its ‘competitors’ 
– Hooghe and Marks (2019, p. 4) – who noted that “[l]iberal intergovernmentalism 
conceives institutional outcomes as functional responses to cooperation problems 
[…,] anticipat[ing] that states will delegate or pool just enough authority to ensure 
that national governments will find it in their interest to comply with the deal”. 
Once again, the obvious assumption here is that the EU Member States remain 
effectively liberal in general, and positively liberal towards the EU’s ‘togetherness’ 
when such an exercise needs to be performed. Arguing, bargaining, and being not 
fully satisfied are distinguishing features of the liberal intergovernmentalism-based 
framework. Undermining, humiliating, and questioning the EU as an objectively 
reliable provider of multi-dimensional opportunities cannot be considered natural 
for liberal intergovernmentalism in the process of seeking solutions. The latter 
statement is still in full agreement with Schimmelfennig’s argument that this theory 
of integration “offers no specific propositions to account for the crisis as such” (2015, 
p. 178).
Since 2007, when Estonia realised that its dependence on information and 
communication technologies leads to new vulnerabilities and exposes its society to 
existential threats operating through cyberspace, it has become a global heavyweight 
in cybersecurity with several innovations implemented in the technological, 
legal and political domains, and deservedly can be referred to as an avant-garde 
experimental bunny after introducing innovations like e-residency (Särav, Kerikmäe, 
and Kasper, 2017). Inspired by Estonia’s success and after examining other top scorers 
in cybersecurity indexes, several observations can be made, and which will provide 
an overall discussion in this chapter.
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According to the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index, Estonia achieved peak scores 
in legal and technical commitments, occupying the fifth position after the UK, the 
USA, France and Lithuania (ITU, 2018, p. 18). Although cooperation commitments 
generally remain low, Lithuania, Estonia, the UK, Spain and France take the lead 
in the EU, while the EU as a whole is far more committed to cooperation than other 
regions of the world (ITU, 2018, p. 49). According to the National Cyber Security 
Index administered by the Estonian E-Governance Academy, which measures the 
preparedness of states to prevent cyber threats and manage incidents, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania and France are the global leaders, with Germany 
and the UK following them. However, the digital development levels of these 
countries do not seem to provide a simple plausible explanation for scoring high 
in cybersecurity. The curious cases of Estonia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic – 
where the digital development scores are modest – imply that factors other than 
economic ones may have significant impacts on governments’ plans.
Since the end of 1990s, the EU has been engaged in fighting ‘classical’ cybercrimes 
and it has adopted positions on the negotiations on the CoE Convention on 
Cybercrime. As one of the early attempts to raise the complex issue of cybersecurity 
to the EU level, the Spanish Presidency proposed in 2001 the establishment of an 
EU Research and Technological Alert Center (Council of the EU, 2001). Although 
the proposal referred to ‘cybercrime’, its reasoning was based on concerns raised 
from national security threats following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Spanish 
proposal was somewhat misinformed about the lack of initiatives. The Stockholm 
European Council of 23–24 March 2001 concluded that “the Council together with 
the Commission will develop a comprehensive strategy on security of electronic 
networks including practical implementing action” (European Council, 2001). A few 
months earlier, the Commission had also referred to the growing national security 
concerns and difficulties in providing security due to liberalization, convergence 
and globalization (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Council was quick to turn its attention to address 
terrorist threats and critical infrastructure protection, which included information 
and communication technology and the internet (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004).
While the Commission has examined the available electronic communication 
infrastructures and their robustness in 2007 in high detail, cybersecurity remained 
an ‘exotic’ topic for the Member States. Three overlapping sets of EU policies were 
pursued in parallel. One was on cybercrime, which could be traced back to the need 
to deal with organised and high-tech crime – predominantly motivated by economic 
gain. The other concerned critical information infrastructure protection, which 
can be linked to the recognition of terrorist threats – assumed to be motivated by 
ideology. The third was on strengthening the information society to complete the 
Single Market, hence economic considerations.
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After the large-scale cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, the terminological 
construct of critical information infrastructure protection started featuring in the 
Council’s agenda with increasing frequency, and, between 27 and 28 April 2009, 
Tallinn hosted a ministerial conference, stressing the importance of cybersecurity 
based on its own painful experience. The Member States’ ostrich-like policies were 
about to change, following security threats close to home, and after realising the 
possibilities that cyberspace could be used for political purposes, following the 2008 
cyberattacks against Lithuania and Georgia.
Preferences shifted towards establishing common policies, common mechanisms 
and coordination. The interdependencies between policy areas, the evolving and 
growing threat landscape, and the complexity of cybersecurity left Member States 
with no real alternatives but to merge the separate policies into a single comprehensive 
one at EU level. While 12 Member States decided to ratify the CoE Convention on 
Cybercrime after 200732, the 18-month trio-presidency programme of the Council led 
by the Polish, Danish and Cypriot Presidencies, in 2011 already raised cybersecurity 
issues going beyond cybercrime (Council of the EU, 2011).
In 2012, the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues was established as a 
cross-cutting forum for coordination and cooperation and exchange of information 
encompassing various fields of expertise. In a December 2012 meeting of the group on 
Cyber Issues, the Netherlands  reported yet another real cyberattack33, and emphasised 
the need for cross-border cooperation. In the meantime, Estonia announced its next 
Cyber Security Conference, which was organised in Brussels.
In the context of the 18-month trio-residency programme of the Council for the 
period 1 January 2013 to 30 June 2014, the Irish, Lithuanian and Greek Presidencies, 
clearly referred to cybersecurity as one of the global challenges faced by the EU 
(Council of the EU, 2012). The first EU Cybersecurity Strategy was adopted in 2013, but 
the Member States resisted significant deepening of integration in several politically 
sensitive areas. The Member States’ approach to comprehensive cybersecurity 
was tailored to the needs of sovereign states and was followed by the adoption of 
an outline for European Cyber Diplomacy Engagement. The Members States 
regularly discussed cyber defence questions, and the Council adopted the EU Cyber 
Defence Policy Framework at the end of 2014 (Council of the EU, 2014a). While the 
Member States’ approach to information sharing and their readiness to express their 
positions publicly on cybersecurity is still cautious, the high interest in clarifying 
the normative frameworks became evident in The Hague Process, when over 50 
countries participated in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 consultations on how international 
32 Those were Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK.
33 The Netherlands have previously experienced the Diginotar incident, although there are 
no indications that this particular case was discussed at the meeting.
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law could apply to cyber operations – although, state input in the Manual remains 
confidential (Asser Institute, 2016).
The subsequent Italian, Latvian, and Luxembourgish trio Presidencies also 
strongly emphasised comprehensive cybersecurity, and laid out an ambitious agenda 
prioritising internal and external actions (Council of the EU, 2014b). For the period 
between 1 January 2016 and 30 June 2017, the Dutch, Slovak and Maltese Presidencies 
aimed to have a comprehensive and integrated approach to cybersecurity, and kept 
the focus thereon, although their programme was more pragmatic, and increased 
secrecy in the Council’s work on cyber issues became evident (Council of the EU, 
2015). The Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues, drawing on the “claimed 
to be state-sponsored hack of the Ukrainian power grid” prepared a non-paper 
suggesting a joint response to coercive cyber operations, namely the development 
of the cyber diplomacy toolbox under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (Council of the EU, 2016). The strategic 
environment also led to a new impetus in EU-NATO partnership, and the Joint 
Declaration in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 included cybersecurity and defence as an 
area where cooperation should be enhanced. In 2016, the Horizontal Working Party 
on Cyber Issues was established, replacing the Friends of Presidency Group, while 
the world learned about the DNC hack and Russian interference in U.S. elections 
(arguably, both cases sent clear signs about the vulnerabilities of national elections).
The Estonian, Bulgarian and Austrian Presidencies prioritized cybersecurity 
policy as an integral part of a genuine Security Union (Council of the EU, 2017), 
and Estonia laid out a very strong digital agenda building on its 2007 experience 
of large-scale cyberattacks and the EU’s cybersecurity package was rolled out on 13 
September 2017. This updated the EU’s cybersecurity strategy, and included proposals 
for institutional changes in terms of establishing the EU Cybersecurity Agency, 
integrating cybersecurity into existing EU-level crisis management frameworks, 
and adopting the Cybersecurity Diplomacy Toolbox. In 2017, the Czech Republic 
also discovered that for many years Russia and China had penetrated its Foreign 
Ministry’s information systems (Czech security service says Russia behind cyber 
attacks on ministry, Reuters, 2018).
Current focus in the Council appears to centre on the implementation of the Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox, the detailed discussion of questions related to attribution, cyber 
restrictive measures, preparation for the upcoming discussions in the United Nations 
(UN) on cyber issues in the context of international security, as well as cybersecurity 
capabilities and capacity building.
Having pointed out some key turning points, the authors note that despite the 
Commission’s thorough analyses and reasoning about interdependencies and security 
threats, the impetus to develop policies came from the Member States governments, 
prompted by their realisation of the political threats posed by cyberattacks. Since 
the EU is not a federal state, the arguments for sovereign autonomy of the Member 
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States overwhelmed the functional arguments for deepening integration, which is an 
underlying need for small states in an interconnected world. Ambitious Commission 
proposals were toned down and reformulated, under the Council’s leadership, in a 
manner that better corresponds to the Member States’ readiness to cooperate and 
share in potentially sensitive areas of cybersecurity.
Post-functionalism: channeling a political conflict towards a common 
good
A post-functionalist theory of European integration,  has  an empirically stable base 
as a point of departure: a) it has the possibility to detect how “domestic patterns of 
conflict across the [EU] constrain the course of European integration”; b) “no one has 
succeeded in reducing the debate to rational economic interest”; and c) since national 
communities are demanding more self-rule, “the preference for self-rule is almost 
always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority” (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2008, p. 2). However, where does the initial push for action come from? 
The theory refers to the prime role that a political conflict “makes all the difference, 
and […] engages communal identities” (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 2).
In the context of classical functionalism and apart from “common material 
needs” (Mitrany, 1975, p. 145), in principle an integrative task, “can be narrow or 
comprehensive in scope” (Smith, 2004, p. 22). In addition, “an action to stop the 
process or to go backwards is a function-performing exercise” as well (Vernygora et. 
al., 2016, p. 15). At the same time, this post-functionalist view on where a desirably 
effective functionality can ‘reside’ within the framework of European integration 
claimes that there could be a need to “probe beyond the economic preferences of 
interest groups” (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 5). Is it not what cybersecurity needs 
to ‘hear’?
While post-functionalist literature on EU cybersecurity is almost non-existent, it 
could be possible that functionality resides with interest groups – since cyberspace 
is predominantly owned and operated by the private sector. However, one should 
consider those factors that characterise cyberspace – particularly, the compression 
of time and space in this context, which challenges not only the worldviews, but the 
core elements of the current international order based on territoriality. In addition, 
technical challenges and the lack of a common vocabulary in the technical and non-
technical fields do not favour political institutions in identifying common domestic 
constraints to integration, which could be formulated into a joint agenda by the 
relevant actors. Scholars who write on cyber power refer to the passive role of non-
state actors who recognize the need of their ‘intellectual capital’, while stressing that 
the “state is the political entity that needs to learn how to optimize its cyber power” 
(Dunn Cavelty, 2019, p. 307).
The fragmentation and diverse interests in cybersecurity make it almost impossible 
to create a community (besides the ones headed by  national  governments or another 
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central institution) on cybersecurity. Cybersecurity does not (yet?) typically feature 
on national political parties’ agendas, while interests intertwined with cybersecurity 
cannot be reduced purely to economic or political ones given their complexities. 
Policies on cybersecurity feature military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, legal, 
ethical and social considerations. Cyberattacks are not immediately apparent to 
communities, and tend to be discovered months after their commencement. Unless 
they lead to consequences, which affect the physical world in a palpable manner, 
it cannot be confidently assumed that societal processes on their own will lead to 
comprehensive cybersecurity policies. People are unlikely to perceive a ‘common 
material need’ to have such policies.
Cyberspace is not a homogenous community, but a conglomerate resembling 
a loose open source community without a central point, sharing overlapping 
principles and agreements at the technological level. While some participants can 
be mature enough to ride on established frameworks, the rest move with the flow; 
trusting a central coordinating authority to show what is to be done next. Those 
who behave in this way often find their ideas suppressed by overriding political 
considerations, and naturally in such an environment only the strongest and most 
persistent, usually large private actors can pursue impactful initiatives. Joint private 
initiatives to engage with policy-makers have been reported in the USA (see, for 
example, Breland, 2018), and significant similar efforts by think tanks have become 
evident, such as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, but the 
situation in the EU remains considerably more fragmented given the different levels 
of development of the Member States’ cybersecurity policies. Controversially, Dunn 
Cavelty (2018) claims that the ENISA’s (EU Agency for Cybersecurity)  main reason for 
proposing standards and norms to the industry, was to ensure as little influence from 
governments as possible. However, do we expect (trans)national actors and industry 
to consider various potential national security implications to the full, and then 
choose the policy option that may be the best solution for European society, even at 
the expense of losses to shareholders?
In the meantime, while the responsibility for cybersecurity is pushed down to the 
national levels, little politicisation at the domestic levels can be detected (see Chapter 
six by Kasper in this book). Decision-making rarely takes place in the arena of mass 
politics and steps towards integration have not been linked to identity issues or to 
cultural divides that polarise societies. Hence, it appears that in its current form, 
the post-functional theory of European integration cannot provide a definitive 
explanation of all the realities of cybersecurity policy in the EU.
A contemporary empire on a mission to engage its periphery?
These days, as Zielonka noted, “[i]n the field of diplomacy it is virtually impossible 
to conclude any global negotiations without the consent of [the United States, the 
EU, Russia, and China]” (2012, p. 509), while also arguing that these important actors 
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“‘look, talk and walk’ like empires” (2012, p. 502). Arguably, this imperial paradigm is 
academically useful, has no negative connotation, and can be employed in different 
analytical exercises. The point is that the EU tends to claim its “technocratic or 
institutional superiority”, making the essence of the entity’s civilising mission 
to be bound around exporting ‘good’ governance (Zielonka, 2012, pp. 515 and 
511). Remarkably, it goes very well with one of the major priorities of the 2013 EU 
Cybersecurity Strategy, which proposed focusing on establishing “a coherent 
international cyberspace policy for the EU and promote EU values” (European 
Commission, 2013). It can be noted that one of the operational objectives of this 
priority may be based around an idea to engage the EU’s periphery into the process.
The race for domination in cyberspace has long begun and recently it has found 
concrete form in the UN-framed discussion on cybersecurity. While U.S. dominance 
of cyberspace, in technological terms, remains unquestioned (not unchallenged 
though), in other ‘soft’ areas a clear competition has become manifest. When, in 1998 
the Russian Federation proposed a draft UN resolution on cybersecurity, it was not 
taken seriously. However, it ignited a process in which the developments in this field 
were noted by the so-called UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security (UN GGE). The work of the UN GGE went mostly unnoticed and was fruitless 
until 2013, when the experts finally made a breakthrough: international law applies 
to states’ cyber operations (Kaljurand, 2016, p. 112). While this conclusion may now 
seem like a no-brainer, the UN GGE never managed to answer the question as to how 
international law applies (Henriksen, 2019).
A competition for the ‘legal’ dominance of cyberspace officially commenced in late 
2018, when both a new open-ended working group and a new GGE was approved 
by the UN. The proposal to set up an open-ended working group was sponsored 
by Russia, while the proposal for the GGE was backed by the U.S. and like-minded 
states, including the EU Member States. Many states in the UN are still undecided 
about their approach to cybersecurity, participating in both or none of these groups, 
hence these recent developments clearly signify a major contest between two 
fundamentally different ideologies on how cyberspace should be governed/ruled. It 
is no surprise that the Council and the EU Member States are preparing for these 
meetings, nevertheless it also straightens out illusions that the EU is limited to 
economic cooperation, since the EU seems to be embarking on a global ‘civilizing 
mission’, at least in as far as online human rights are concerned, while at the same 
time prioritizing capacity building in cybersecurity.
The EU has been engaging in bilateral cyber-partnerships with key countries, such 
as the U.S. (perhaps the most comprehensive relationship), Canada, Japan, Brazil (on 
cybercrime and research) and some other ’strategic partners’, amongst them India 
and the Republic of Korea, are seen as the most promising. Bilateral cooperation 
with Russia and China is less straightforward, since these countries are perceived 
as the main source of major cyberattacks and cyberespionage in the EU – although 
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confidence-building initiatives have been reported mainly in the fight against 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism (Renard, 2018, pp. 328–330).
The three ‘Cyber Pillars’ of the EU
In the past five years, the ENISA reported that each year cybercriminals remained 
the most active threat agent group in cyberspace. In 2018 they were responsible for 
over 80% of incidents, affecting approximately 0.8% of GDP (ENISA, 2019, p. 119). 
Over 60% of email traffic contained malicious content, and email was involved in 
90% of the cyber-attacks. In second place came the ‘insiders’ threat agent group with 
25% of breaches, attributed to insiders in corporate environments. That same year, 
states as threat agent group came in third place. ENISA observed attempts to increase 
the impact of cyberattacks (particularly, in critical infrastructures). ENISA (2019, 
117–118) also pointed out that “[i]t is assumed that traditional state sponsored threat 
agents are currently repositioning themselves in the changing geopolitical space”. 
The discovery of vulnerabilities continues to increase and advanced threat actors “are 
making progress in using the supply chain to achieve their objectives”. The EU is 
facing numerous challenges at different levels, but the most significant is clearly 
cybercrime, impacting the economy. However, threats originating from states, and 
the use of the internet by terrorists, as well as the manipulation of social media 
cannot be underestimated either. Links between cybersecurity and hybrid threats 
are also highlighted by the Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats 
(European Commission, 2016b) and media reports using terms such as ‘social media 
warfare’ (The Telegraph, 2019). These trends call for national resilience-building and 
cooperation in law enforcement, as well as deeper trust and cooperation between 
allies such as that between the U.S., the EU and NATO.
Hostile or malicious activity passes through several jurisdictions and leverages 
assets in private hands: for example, botnets use networks and compromised 
computers, servers and IoT devices (i.e. a smart watch, smartphone, smart lightbulb, 
or any internet-connected device) to attack a target system. Similar techniques can 
be used by cybercriminals, terrorist groups, as well as states. Such hostile actors easily 
hide behind anonymity-enabling and/or plausible deniability features of cyberspace. 
In countering such ambiguous attackers, measures need to be applied in several areas 
including underlying technologies, business practices, and market dynamics. There is 
also a need to develop security standards covering critical infrastructure or consumer 
devices, rules for responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities, patching and updating of 
software, regulatory frameworks to address liability issues and the elaboration of the 
‘duty of care’ principle. It also requires building cyber threat intelligence capabilities, 
or controlling the foreign acquisition of critical cyber technologies. In short, it 
calls for a broader view where the lines between the internal and external policies, 
between market-oriented, criminal and defence policies are blurred.
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A nouvelle model of cooperation has to be created by/for the EU to realise its 
objectives in cybersecurity. Historically, the EU has been shaped by schematic 
grand-scale structural pillars. This approach can once again be used to clarify the 
EU’s vision and strengthen its actions on cybersecurity. A ‘Cyber Maastricht’ model 
could be constructed, based on the following three pillars: Resilience, Deterrence, 
and Defence & International Relations/IR (see Figure 1 for details). The model’s 
structural elements are not new, and what is more important is the place, the nature 
of the elements, and the interrelations between the proposed pillars as foundations 
for new governance institutions.
FIGURE 1: A ‘CYBER MAASTRICHT’ MODEL
Source: Authors
A gargantuan element of the world’s political economy, the EU needs to be capable 
of recovering as fast as possible after a prospective cyberattack. Moreover, given the 
tightness of intra-entity cooperation, a resilient EU means a great deal more than a 
resilient Member State taken separately from the EU, immaterial as to whether such 
a state is big or small. However, such a pillar structure finds plenty of operational 
space within a post-functional framework.
While cyber resilience-building in the EU is often justified by the need to complete 
the single market, one needs to look beyond economic considerations and realise the 
informational interdependence of actors, which is very visible, as for example in the 
vulnerability of disclosure mechanisms (or the lack of them). Security information, 
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just like cyber-tools, tends to have a dual use. Interdependence is multi-dimensional, 
and leads to the necessity of appropriate institutions and mechanisms for sharing 
information among private players, between private and public sector, and between 
states. However, current solutions include one-way or voluntary information flows, 
in which bridges to other pillars are difficult to build. Resilience is also linked to 
technological factors, such as the presence or absence of a high number of errors/
bugs/flaws in products, which leads to fewer public concerns and also calls for 
interaction with other pillars to decrease vulnerabilities. This also fits the concept 
of deterrence by denial as opposed to deterrence by punishment (Burton, 2018, p. 
9). Thus, the resilience pillar’s aim is to increase both private and public sectors’ 
accountability for technologies to absorb malicious cyber activities and incidents, as 
well as transparency among actors to the maximum possible level.
If a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ can establish a normative re-conceptualisation of the EU 
as a deterrence provider, it can lead to a significant change with regards to the EU’s 
geo-strategic role. The dominant legislative side of this pillar can, in principle, be 
supported by the theoretical platform of liberal intergovernmentalism. A range of 
serious ‘credible commitments’ can be worked out, for example, on ‘attribution and 
e-evidence’, which are also relevant in the context of the third pillar where they are 
guided by the strict constraints of criminal legal frameworks rather than political 
ones. Whereas national governments as gatekeepers to protect the interest of societies 
are privileged actors in the second and the third pillars, their losses in authority by 
means of surrendering competences to EU is compensated by gains in legitimacy 
and problem-solving capabilities. As reluctant or incapable as Member States have 
been to resolve conflicts between law enforcement needs and fundamental human 
rights regarding the data retention regime, functional pressures – arising from the 
trans-border nature of data flows and cyberattacks, and the fact that cyberspace is over 
80% in the hands of the private sector – provide strong and credible commitments to 
cooperation because it has become an existential need.
On cyber deterrence, some commentators do not accept the relevance of this 
concept due to the credibility of the threat of punishment (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
1996, p. 94) and attribution problems (Clark and Landau, 2010). On the other hand, 
Rid and Buchanan (2015, p. 7) argue that attribution is “what states make of it”, and 
not a binary relationship. Just as criminal law theory accepts that absolute obedience 
to the law cannot be guaranteed, the 2017 EU strategy accepts that no ICT product, 
system or service can be guaranteed to be ‘100 %’ secure and not all cyberattacks 
can be prevented. Therefore, the goal should not be that of achieving absolute 
deterrence and unrealistically seeking to prevent all cyberattacks from occurring, 
but to maintain an effective deterrence posture by strong messages and responses 
aimed against offenders and thus force aggressors to recalculate their intentions. In 
short, focus on prevention (Tor, 2017, pp. 94–95). The measures taken in this area 
by the EU range from technical to legal and political ones; from encouraging the 
uptake of IPv6(Intern Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is the communications protocol (IP) 
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that provides an identification and location system for computers on networks and 
routes traffic across the internet.)
 to stepping up the law enforcement and political response, to cooperation with the 
financial sector and building the cyber defence capabilities of the EU Member States.
A ‘Cyber Maastricht’, with its Defence & IR pillar, can lead the EU to a breakthrough 
by becoming more relevant geo-strategically. Cybersecurity is not an isolated policy, 
but in the context of today’s security challenges, a shift to new platforms enabled 
by current technologies. In the light of setbacks in integration due to Brexit and 
the mixed messages received from the U.S. on its defence outlook for Europe, a 
militarized cyberspace is certainly a good reason to aim for as part of the EU’s strategic 
autonomy and security union. An integral part of this militarised cyberspace relies 
on the EU’s cybersecurity efforts. However, as cyber defence is part of the EU’s broader 
cybersecurity policy, it remains unclear how it fits into the concept of “strategic 
autonomy” (European Commission, 2016a) and defence union – whether or not 
strategic autonomy includes EU level operational capabilities, and if yes, what kind, 
and whether or not strategic autonomy means ‘independence’ for the underlying 
industry. Although currently there are initiatives to boost operational capabilities of 
the member states and foster cyber defence innovation in the EU (for example in the 
framework of PESCO and the European Defence Fund), these actions are more aimed 
at coordination leaving the EU with the role of an advisory, or at best a coordinator 
in some areas related to budget and high-level crisis response. While BREXIT may 
open some doors for deeper integration in cyber defence, some might be perceiving a 
potentially growing strategic autonomy of the EU and a defence union as undesirable, 
and damaging to U.S. defence/industrial interests (Fiott, 2018, p. 7). Others advocate 
executive powers to the EU institutions in cyber defence and the establishment of a 
Cyber Defence Agency (Griffith, 2018).
Indirectly tilting toward the imperial paradigm, the EU will enhance its 
cooperation on cybersecurity with the like-minded NATO, and it will have more 
chances to cooperate with the UN, particularly with the UN GGE, while solidifying 
‘Capacity Building’ mechanisms in the neighbourhood. It will do the same, wherever 
its ‘civilising mission’ (e.g. promoting ‘Human Rights’) leads it to. Defence is not 
Resilience, but, together with Deterrence, it has a durable common basis, constructed 
out of the ‘Member States Defence Capabilities’, the ‘EU Crisis Response’, and ‘Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolkit in the CFSP’. Once again, in order to build this ‘pedestal’ for the two 
pillars, some ‘raw material’ will need to be supplied by liberal intergovernmentalism, 
but this is a routine issue, which should start by finding a common definition of EU 
cybersecurity, clarifying the content for clusters for its overall policy, identifying 
exogenous and endogenous influencing factors and taking stock of available 
resources in a systematic manner. In short, should the EU consider converting the 
model of a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ into reality, it just needs to make an effort. Time is, 
unfortunately, running out.
205
Conclusion
This paper engaged in a comprehensive search for a relevant theoretical concept (or 
a right mixture of several theories) that best explain integration processes in the EU’s 
cybersecurity governance. We examined both internal and external domains – since 
the line between these is blurred in cyberspace – with the application of toolboxes 
provided by neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, post-functionalism and the 
imperial paradigm. The discussion led this research towards creating a schematic 
model that essentially represents a scholarly call on the necessity for the EU to 
formulate a ‘Cyber Maastricht’. Characteristically for the proposed pillar-based 
model, it requires almost no ‘assistance’ from the neo-functional spillover, which has 
previously helped the EU to realise achievements in the field of political economy, 
but has not been so effective in the sphere of geo-strategy. Instead, a far more 
sophisticated combination of integration-driven theories will be needed, and this 
fact in itself depicts a positive sign for the EU to remain relevant, creative and flexible 
in its policymaking. This is especially important when it comes to addressing the 
issue of cybercrime and cyber defence – the alternative, a cumbersome policy on 
cybersecurity, can quickly push the EU into mediocrity.
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